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   Every first-year law student learns that when the 
government infringes on a fundamental right, the law or 
government action in question is subject to strict scrutiny; the 
government must show that is has a compelling purpose to 
override a fundamental constitutional right. The Free Exercise 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that no person can be 
compelled to do something contrary to his or her religious 
beliefs. However, in its 1990 ruling in Oregon v. Smith1 the U.S. 
Supreme Court stripped religious liberty of the protections 
afforded other fundamental rights. This article will examine how 
federal and state governments have reacted to this decision, and 
the unanticipated difficulties that have resulted.  
 
 
II. OREGON v. SMITH 
 
  Employees Smith and Black were fired by a private drug 
rehabilitation clinic because they ingested peyote, a  
__________________________________________ 
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hallucinogenic drug, as part of their religious ceremonies.2 They 
were members of the Native American Church, at which 
sacramental peyote use was well documented. Their applications 
for unemployment compensation were denied by the State of 
Oregon due to a state law that disqualified employees from 
receiving unemployment benefits if discharged for work-related 
"misconduct". At the time, intentional possession of peyote was 
a crime under Oregon law, with no affirmative defense for 
religious use.3 Holding that the denial of unemployment 
compensation violated the respondents' First Amendment free 
exercise rights, the State Court of Appeals reversed the decision, 
and the State Supreme Court affirmed. However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for 
a determination as to whether sacramental peyote use was 
prohibited by Oregon's controlled substance law. This law 
makes it a felony to knowingly or intentionally possess the 
drug.4 Pending that determination, the U.S. Supreme Court 
refused to decide whether such use was protected by the 
Constitution. On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that 
sacramental peyote use violated, and was not excepted from, the 
state law prohibition. However, the Court further concluded that 
the prohibition was not valid under the Free Exercise Clause. 
The state unemployment division appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, again arguing that the denial of Smith's and Black's 
unemployment benefits was proper because possession of 
peyote was a crime.5 
 
 In a surprising departure from precedent, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that Oregon's prohibition of sacramental 
peyote was valid under the Free Exercise Clause, and therefore 
the state could deny unemployment benefits to persons 
discharged for such use.6 The majority stated that "any otherwise 
valid law" defeats a claim to religious liberty. It further stated 
that the First Amendment does not entitle a religious objector to 
an exemption “from obedience to a general law,” otherwise 
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“every citizen (would) become a law unto himself.”7 Of 
particular importance was the fact that the Oregon law was not 
specifically directed at the Native Americans' religious practice; 
thus, it was deemed constitutional when applied to all citizens. 
 
   In concurring and dissenting opinions, three Supreme 
Court justices vehemently disagreed with the majority’s position 
in Smith. They argued that, consistent with the Court’s 
precedents and its treatment of other fundamental rights, 
religious freedom could not be abridged unless the government 
had a compelling reason to do so, such as forbidding human 
sacrifice or requiring medical care for gravely ill children.8   
 
 As a result of the majority opinion in Smith, free exercise 
of religion is the only fundamental right that is not protected by 
the "compelling interest” test, requiring strict scrutiny by the 
Court. If the government no longer must have a compelling 
interest, minority religions would have to make exceptions to 
their beliefs and practices to comply with specified laws. The 
government no longer had to make exceptions to its laws or rules 
to obey the Constitution's guarantee of religious freedom. To 
restore the "compelling interest" test, in 1993 Congress passed 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),9 stating that a 
religiously neutral law can burden a religion to the same extent 
as a law that intended to inhibit religious practices. 
 
 
III. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT 
 
 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was 
introduced by Congressman Chuck Schumer on March 11, 
1993. A companion bill was introduced in the Senate by Ted 
Kennedy that same day. A unanimous U.S. House and a nearly 
unanimous U.S. Senate passed the bill, and 
President Clinton signed RFRA into law on November 16, 
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1993.10 RFRA prohibits the “Government [from] substantially 
burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability” unless the 
Government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the 
person: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.”11 A government interest is 
compelling when it is more than routine and does more than 
simply improve government efficiency. RFRA covers “any 
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, 
a system of religious belief.”12  
 
 RFRA clearly applies "to all Federal law, and the 
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise", 
including any Federal statutory law adopted after RFRA's date 
of signing "unless such law explicitly excludes such 
application."13 Originally, Congress intended that RFRA apply 
to actions by state and local governments. However in 1997, in 
City of Boerne v. Flores,14 the Supreme Court struck down 
RFRA with respect to states and other local municipalities 
within them, stating that Congress had exceeded its power as 
provided in the Fourteenth Amendment. This resulted in many 
states passing their own versions of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act. These Acts apply to laws passed and actions 
taken by individual state and local governments.  
 
 
IV. STATES AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
 
 To what extent do various states protect their citizens’ 
religious freedoms when a state or local law attempts to violate 
religious liberty? Currently thirty-one (31) states have 
protections for their citizens, which can be classified into two 
categories: 
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 1.  Twenty-one (21) states have passed RFRA-like 
statutes; and 
 
 2.  Ten (10) states15 have RFRA-like provisions that were 
provided by state Court decisions rather than by legislation. 
 
 The following twenty-one (21) states have passed 
RFRA-like statutes:  Alabama,16 Arizona,17 Arkansas,18 
Connecticut,19 Florida,20 Idaho,21 Illinois,22 Indiana,23 Kansas,24 
Kentucky,25 Louisiana,26 Mississippi,27 Missouri,28 New 
Mexico,29 Oklahoma,30 Pennsylvania,31 Rhode Island,32 South 
Carolina,33 Tennessee,34 Texas,35 and Virginia.36 Two states, 
Connecticut and Rhode Island, passed their acts prior to the 1997 
Boerne decision. The remaining nineteen (19) states passed 
RFRA-like statutes as a direct response to Boerne.  
 
 State RFRA laws require the "Sherbert Test," which was 
set forth by Sherbert v. Verner,37 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,38 
mandating that strict scrutiny be used when determining 
whether the Free Exercise Clause has been violated. However, 
state RFRAs contain unique provisions beyond this basic 
principle. For example, five states39 do not require the burden or 
restriction on religion to be "substantial." While the Supreme 
Court has not distinguished between "substantial burden" and 
"burden" in the context of state RFRAs, some decisions have 
attempted to distinguish the terms. Some states define "burden" 
or "substantial burden" within their statutes, and these 
definitions vary. Burdens must be greater than "trivial" or "de 
minimis infractions" in Arizona and Idaho. They are defined as 
actions that would "inhibit or curtail religious practice" in 
Oklahoma, Tennessee and Virginia. In contrast, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana and Pennsylvania list examples of specific 
burdens in their RFRAs.40  
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 Arkansas, Indiana and Texas provide that their states’ 
RFRA can be invoked even when the government is not 
involved in the lawsuit. Under the Arkansas law, religious rights 
can be invoked to obtain an injunction or damages against an 
individual who insists that a person complies with a state 
regulation that violates that person's religious beliefs. Indiana’s 
law similarly allows religious rights to be invoked as a claim or 
a defense in a private civil lawsuit. Texas allows its law to be 
used only as a defense “without regard to whether the 
proceeding is brought in the name of the state or another 
person.”41 In the remaining eighteen (18) states with RFRA-like 
statutes, the lawsuit must be invoked against the government, 
presumably in response to the laws that restrict a person's 
religious practices. 
 
 Congress' passage of RFRA in 1993 was meant to restore 
the "compelling interest” test, requiring strict scrutiny by the 
Court, whenever an individual's religious liberty was being 
infringed. However, some states have passed laws that 
specifically allow discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. Indiana allows business owners who object to same-
sex couples on religious grounds to opt out of providing them 
services. A Mississippi law protects people who refuse to serve 
others on the basis of a religious objection to same-sex marriage, 
transgender people, or extramarital sex from government 
punishment. South Dakota has a law that allows taxpayer-
funded adoption agencies to deny services under circumstances 
that conflict with their religious beliefs.42 It is ironic that a statute 
originally conceived of as protecting religious diversity has 
become a symbol of intolerance. 
 
 While protecting an individual's religious liberty should 
be seen as a good and noble mission, much controversy has 
surrounded RFRA laws in recent years. One reason is the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal RFRA in the 
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Hobby Lobby case.43 A second development was the legalization 
of same-sex marriage in the United States, and the subsequent 
concern that the public accommodation laws would not protect 




V. BURWELL v. HOBBY LOBBY 
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. is an arts and crafts company 
founded and owned by the Green family, who are Evangelical 
Christians. It provided health insurance for its approximately 
21,000 employees until 2012, when it dropped its coverage. 
Hobby Lobby did not wish to provide coverage for certain types 
of FDA-approved contraceptives for its female employees 
which they considered abortion.44 Under the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (ACA), employment-based group 
health care plans must provide certain types of preventative care, 
which included the aforementioned FDA-approved 
contraceptive methods. While there are exemptions available for 
religious employers and non-profit religious institutions, there 
were no exemptions available for for-profit institutions such as 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.45 
  In September 2012, the Greens, as representatives of 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued the Department of Health and 
Human Services, and challenged the contraception requirement. 
As plaintiffs they argued that the requirement that the 
employment-based group health care plan cover contraception 
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and 
the federal RFRA. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction 
to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district 
court denied and a two-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied 
relief, and the plaintiffs filed for an en banc hearing of the Court 
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of Appeals. This hearing resulted in a reversal, and it was held 
that corporations were "persons" for the purposes of RFRA and 
therefore had protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment. The Department of Health and Human 
Services appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.46  
 In June 2014 the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress 
intended for RFRA to be read as applying to closely held 
corporations, since they are composed of individuals who use 
them to achieve desired ends. Because the contraception 
requirement forces religious corporations to fund what they 
consider abortion, which goes against their stated religious 
principles, or face significant fines, it creates a substantial 
burden. The ruling was reached on statutory grounds, citing 
RFRA, because the mandate was not the "least restrictive" 
method of implementing the government's interest. In fact, a less 
restrictive method already existed in the form of the Department 
of Health and Human Services' exemption for non-profit 
religious organizations, which they treated as "persons" within 
the meaning of RFRA. The Court held that this exemption can 
and should be applied to for-profit closely held corporations 
such as Hobby Lobby.47  
 The ruling did not address Hobby Lobby's claims under 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, but solely by 
applying RFRA. "Congress, in enacting RFRA, took the position 
that 'the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court 
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between 
religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests' ... 
The wisdom of Congress's judgment on this matter is not our 
concern. Our responsibility is to enforce RFRA as written, and 
under the standard that RFRA prescribes, the Department of 
Health and Human Services contraceptive mandate is 
unlawful.48 
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 It is interesting to note that three states had already 
specifically defined "person" in their state RFRAs to include 
corporations. Two states, Indiana and South Carolina, define a 
person as, among other things, a corporation, and Kansas defines 
a person as “any legal person or entity” under Kansas or federal 
law.49 So why is Hobby Lobby considered a landmark case? It 
was the first time that the Supreme Court made it clear that for-
profit, closely held corporations can assert religious rights. Are 
these businesses now exempt from the anti-discrimination 
provisions of the public accommodation law? 
 
 
VI. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION LAW 
 
 Under federal law, public accommodations may not 
discriminate. A place of public accommodation is defined as: 
"any place of business engaged in any sales to the general public 
and any place that offers services, facilities, privileges, or 
advantages to the general public or that receives financial 
support through solicitation of the general public or through 
governmental subsidy of any kind."50 Private clubs and religious 
organizations are specifically exempted from this definition. 
Therefore, for-profit public accommodations, regardless of the 
nature of the goods and services provided, may not discriminate 
on the basis of any classification prohibited by federal or state 
law.  
 
 Now that for-profit, closely held corporations can assert 
religious rights, may they claim that the public accommodation 
law substantially burdens their exercise of religion by requiring 
them to act in contravention of their religious beliefs? For 
example, conservative Christians and others argue that they have 
a sincere religious belief that marriage must be only between one 
man and one woman. Facilitating or assisting individuals to 
enter other kinds of marital relationships requires them to act 
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against their religious beliefs. It seems to follow that only if the 
state can show it has a compelling interest in requiring these 
businesses to take part, they will be excused from participating 
in the marriage festivities of same-sex couples. To remedy this, 
nineteen (19) states have public accommodations laws that 
explicitly protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.51 Is this necessary? Long ago the public 
accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
established the principle that those who open their doors for 
business must serve all who enter. Is the Supreme Court's 
decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, LTD v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission consistent with this principle?52 
 
 The baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop refused to create a 
custom cake for a same-sex couple's wedding celebration on 
religious grounds. It was the baker's sincerely held religious 
belief that marriage should be only between one man and one 
woman.53 At the time same-sex marriage was illegal in 
Colorado. The couple filed a grievance with the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission, and the state determined that the baker 
violated Colorado state law, which provides: 
 
 It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful  
for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse,  
withhold from, or deny to an individual or  
a group, because of .....sexual orientation.....  
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,  
services, facilities, privileges, advantages 
 or accommodations of a place of public 
 accomodation.54 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the state's decision on the 
basis of religious freedom, even though the baker asserted that 
both his freedom of speech and freedom of religion had been 
violated. The key factor leading to the reversal was the Court's 
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determination that Colorado's Civil Rights Commission did not 
give neutral and respectful consideration to the baker's claims. 
The Commission's treatment of the case had some elements of 
clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious 
beliefs that motivated the baker's objection.55  
 
 The Commission disparaged the baker's religious faith 
by describing it as despicable and characterizing it as 
insubstantial and even insincere. The government, consistent 
with the Constitution's guarantee of free exercise of religion, 
cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the religious beliefs 
of citizens and cannot act in a manner that passes judgment upon 
the legitimacy of religious beliefs and practices. Because the 
Commission treated the baker's beliefs with contempt, it failed 
to conduct a fair hearing, and for that reason the Court sided with 
the baker.56 The Court made it clear that while religious 
objections to same-sex marriage are protected, it is a general rule 
that such objections do not allow business owners and other 
actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons 
equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally 
applicable public accommodations law.57 The outcome would 
have been different if the baker had initially received a fair 
hearing. 
 
     
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 Our nation was founded on the principle of religious 
freedom. Our laws protect people from governmental intrusion 
in the practice of their faith, as long as that practice does not run 
afoul of a compelling governmental interest. It has long been the 
task of the Supreme Court to balance the competing rights of 
individuals, and this task has become exceedingly difficult in our 
diverse society. Individuals have the right to live their lives free 
from discrimination, especially when entering a place of 
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business engaged in sales to the general public. It seems clear 
that businesses cannot discriminate against individuals because 
of their sexual orientation; a bakery cannot refuse to sell baked 
goods to gay customers. However, must a baker who 
disapproves of same-sex marriages on religious grounds provide 
a wedding cake to celebrate a same-sex marriage? If the couple 
can easily purchase a cake elsewhere, is it necessary to force 
compliance? In the face of repeated lawsuits and personal 
attacks, religious conservatives have been asking, "Where are 
my rights?" A reasonable accommodation should be made for 
religious objectors when the accommodation is workable, and 
the underlying governmental purpose is still achieved.  
 
 But beware: Not every religious practice or belief can be, 
or need be accommodated. When the law in question serves an 
overriding societal purpose, it is not readily susceptible to 
reasonable accommodations; any accommodation for religion 
would be unreasonable. Therefore, it can be argued that allowing 
religious objectors to discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation is an unreasonable accommodation because these 
laws are essential to societal health, safety and welfare.   
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